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I. INTRODUCTION
The build-up of greenhouse gases released by human activities has
already warmed the Earth’s atmosphere, melted glaciers, intensified
extreme weather events, increased the geographic range of deadly
diseases, and caused mass mortality events in ecosystems
worldwide.1 However, predictions for the future are even bleaker.2
1. See Rafael Coma et al., Global Warming-Enhanced Stratification and Mass
Mortality Events in the Mediterranean, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6176, 6176
(2008) (illustrating the consequences of rising temperatures on marine ecosystems
and the link between above-average water temperatures and the two largest mass
mortality events in the Mediterranean); see also U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Current Evidence of Climate Change, http://unfcc.int/
essential_background/feeling_the_heat/items/2904.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter UNFCCC Current Evidence] (highlighting specific instances of glacier
melts in Greenland and Antarctica, droughts in Africa and floods in Europe,
Africa, and Asia associated with climate change); see also U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Future Effects, http://unfcc.int/
essential_background/feeling_the_heat/items/2905.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter UNFCCC Future Effects] (predicting the expansion of regions acutely
impacted by climate change, including shifting crop growth, and an increase in the
range of diseases such as malaria).
2. See UNFCCC Future Effects, supra note 1 (projecting more than a
doubling of the observed warming, and implying that the resulting climate change
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Scientists predict that by 2030, 20 million people in Bangladesh
alone will be displaced by land succumbing to rising sea levels.3 The
Nobel Prize winning group, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”), predicts that by 2080, 33% of the world’s coastal
wetlands will become open water.4 The IPCC also estimates that
melting glaciers will raise global sea levels by up to two feet in the
next century, consuming an area equal to the size of Massachusetts
and Delaware combined.5 An increase in global temperatures by a
mere 1.5 to 2.5˚C could result in the extinction of 30% of all plant
and animal species, and the IPCC projects increases in the range of
1.1 to 6.4˚C in the next 100 years.6 Extreme weather events ranging
from heat waves to hurricanes are predicted to become more frequent
and more intense.7
Taking into account catastrophic forecasts and acknowledging the
gravity of climate change, nations worldwide ratified the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),
which was adopted as an international legal framework for

related impacts will be more severe than those that have occurred to date).
3. See Emily Wax, In Flood-Prone Bangladesh, a Future That Floats, WASH.
POST (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/09/26/AR2007092602582.html (reporting on the predicted 20 million
Bengali “climate refugees” resulting from sea level rise and the opportunities for
large boats as a potential solution).
4. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Coastal Zones and Sea Level Rise,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/coastal/index.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2011) [hereinafter EPA Coastal Zones] (reporting that the IPCC found that
increases in atmospheric temperatures will melt glaciers, resulting in vast
quantities of water being released into the oceans); see also Press Release,
Nobelprize.org, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 (Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Nobel
Prize], available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/ laureates/2007/
press.html (crediting the award of a split Nobel Prize to IPCC due to the
organization’s work in measuring the consequences of climate change).
5. See EPA Coastal Zones, supra note 4 (revealing that rising sea levels will
swallow approximately 10,000 square miles of land nationwide).
6. See Findings of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change
Impacts,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
(May
17,
2007),
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/ucs-ipcc-wg2-72pi2007.pdf (summarizing the predicted impacts of climate change from the Fourth
IPCC climate assessment, which incorporated input from 3,700 experts from 130
countries).
7. See id. at 3 (expounding that weather events including heat waves,
droughts, floods, and hurricanes are predicted to occur with greater frequency and
intensity as climate change worsens).
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responding to the threat of climate change.8 It calls on parties to
strive to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to
prevent dangerous anthropogenic9 interference with the climate
system.10 It also asks parties to reflect on whether their domestic
policies promote emissions, and encourages international
cooperation on measures to combat climate change.11 Because the
UNFCCC charges parties with reducing their anthropogenic sources
of greenhouse gas emissions, the emissions generated by the
agricultural sector, particularly those by animal agriculture, fall
within the purview of the UNFCCC’s commands.12 Thus, the United
States should not continue to ignore the contribution of animal
agriculture to domestic greenhouse gas emissions, and it should
revisit its agricultural subsidies with a view to discouraging
emissions.13 This is particularly true in light of the fact that animal
agriculture is responsible for approximately 30% of the nation’s
8. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May
9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC] (laying out the objective of the
UNFCCC as the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere);
id. pmbl. (expressing collective concern that the increasing atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases will enhance the warming of the Earth’s
surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and
humankind); see also CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GRP. III TO THE SECOND
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 69 (James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 1995]
(highlighting the importance under the established framework of negotiations
between countries to develop an international response to climate change).
9. “Anthropogenic” means “of, relating to, or resulting from the influence of
human beings on nature.” Anthropogenic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary /anthropogenic (last visited Oct. 10,
2011) [hereinafter Anthropogenic].
10. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (outlining the objective of the UNFCCC
as the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere in order to
reduce the impact on ecosystems, food production, and economic development).
11. See CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 8, at 70 (analyzing the
coordination among “economic and administrative instruments” and the support
for scientific research on climate change that the UNFCCC requires).
12. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c) (naming the agricultural sector as a
relevant sector for anthropogenic emissions reductions); see also discussion infra
Part II.A (elaborating on the binding nature of the UNFCCC commitments).
13. See discussion infra Parts III-IV (arguing that, because subsidization of
animal agriculture and the associated increase in greenhouse gas emissions is in
contravention of UNFCCC commitments, the United States should reconsider its
agricultural policies).
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emissions of methane, a gas that has at least twenty-one times the
global warming potential of carbon dioxide.14 With the latest climate
conference culminating in an agreement that allows parties to
continue to avoid legally binding emissions reductions until 2020,15 it
is crucial that the United States reflect on and ameliorate policies in
its agricultural sector.16
This Comment argues that U.S. subsidization of animal agriculture
violates Article 4 of the UNFCCC by promoting greenhouse gas
emissions in contravention of its obligation to mitigate emissions.
Part II explores the history and implications of the UNFCCC, as well
14. See CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 8, at 73 (underscoring that climate
change measures should include the phasing out of distortionary policies, such as
subsidies, that directly or indirectly increase greenhouse gas emissions); see also
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2009, ES-5, 2-13 (Apr. 15, 2011) http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads11/US-GHG-Inventory-2011-Complete_Report.pdf [hereinafter GHG
Inventory] (reporting on the greenhouse gas emissions of various sources from the
U.S. indicating agriculture contributes 196.8 of 686.3 Tg of CO2 equivalent
methane, or 29%).
15. See Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Dec. 10, 2011, Draft Decision /CP.17,
available
at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/
decisions/application/pdf/cop17_durbanplatform.pdf
[hereinafter
Durban
Platform]; see also Fiona Harvey & John Vidal, Global Climate Change Treaty In
Sight After Durban Breakthrough, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Dec. 11, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/11/global-climate-changetreaty-durban (explaining that the terms of a legally binding agreement for
UNFCCC parties to reduce their carbon emissions need to be agreed to by 2015,
and that the terms will come into effect in 2020).
16. See U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Kyoto
Protocol, (last visited Oct. 10, 2011), http://unfccc.int/kyoto _protocol/
items/2830.php [hereinafter Info. on Kyoto Protocol] (providing background
information about the Kyoto Protocol, including discussion of a 5% reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions that the thirty-seven nations and the EU are bound to
reach under the Protocol by the end of 2012 ); see also Cancún Agreement Rescues
UN Credibility But Falls Short of Saving Planet, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/dec/12/cancun-agreement-rescuesun-credibility [hereinafter Cancún Agreement] (explaining that key countries such
as Japan and Russia are unlikely to sign further binding emissions agreements
without the U.S.’s commitment); see also Diva Rodriguez, Has COP16 put too
Much Pressure on COP17?, CLIMATE ACTION (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/news/has_cop16_put_too_much_pressure
_on_cop17/ (explaining that, although the Cancún Convention failed to resolve the
future of the Kyoto Protocol, it restored some faith in the United Nations (“U.N.”)
as a forum for dealing with climate change by pushing resolution of the issue onto
the next COP).
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as the significance of the Kyoto Protocol.17 Part II additionally
discusses the role of animal agriculture in global warming and the
ways in which animal agriculture is currently subsidized both
directly and indirectly.18 Part III argues that U.S. subsidies on animal
agriculture violate UNFCCC Article 4 pursuant to a textual analysis
of the Convention, as well as by analogy with domestic law.19 Lastly,
Part IV proposes a number of potential solutions that would bring the
United States into compliance with the UNFCCC.20

II. BACKGROUND
Before it is possible to establish that the United States is in
violation of the UNFCCC due to subsidizing animal agriculture, it is
necessary to properly contextualize the issue. Subsection A of this
Part will explain the legal framework involved, and will also
introduce the Clean Air Act,21 a U.S. law to which the UNFCCC is
compared in Part III.22 Subsection B will describe the relationship
between animal agriculture and global climate change, and establish
the scientific basis for animal agriculture’s considerable climate
changing effect.23 Lastly, Subsection C will connect the earlier two
sections by explaining the economic mechanisms that incentivize
overproduction of animal food commodities, and, consequently, the
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.1–2 (introducing the commitments of the
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and subsequent agreements).
18. See discussion infra Part II.B-C (describing the role of animal agriculture in
climate change, as well as the role of agricultural subsidies in promoting animal
agriculture).
19. See discussion infra Part III.A (showing that UNFCCC Article 4 requires
the United States to reassess agricultural subsidies given their tendency to increase
emissions).
20. See discussion infra Part IV (outlining potential solutions to the UNFCCC
violations stemming from agricultural subsidies).
21. See generally Clean Air Act (Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act) §§
101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006) (establishing a framework for the
reduction of air pollution in the United States).
22. See discussion infra Part II.A.1–3 (framing the argument that subsidies on
animal agriculture frustrate the aims of the UNFCCC by introducing the
requirements of the UNFCCC); see also discussion infra Part II.A.4 (introducing
the Clean Air Act so that a meaningful analogy can be drawn with the UNFCCC to
propel the argument that the UNFCCC is binding).
23. See discussion infra Part II.B (delineating the multiple ways that animal
agriculture creates greenhouse gas emissions and explaining why the impact of its
emissions are so high relative to other sectors).
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emission of greenhouse gases that constitutes the violative
behavior.24

A. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR REGULATING
CLIMATE CHANGE
By the early 1990s, scientists had concluded that emissions of
greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide
were causing a gradual warming of the Earth’s atmosphere and that
this phenomenon would have vast implications for the environment
and humankind.25 In recognition of this, the UNFCCC was adopted
and entered into force in March 1994.26 The objective of the
UNFCCC is to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at a level that will
prevent adverse environmental changes by curbing emissions from
anthropogenic sources.27
The core of the UNFCCC lies in Article 4, which consists of the
“commitments” of the convention.28 While Article 4 uses binding
language,29 the UNFCCC is often referred to as a “non-binding”
24. See discussion infra Part II.C (showing that economic incentives, such as
subsidies, encourage production of subsidized goods, and that subsidies on animal
agriculture thereby encourage greenhouse gas emissions).
25. See Clare Breidenich et al., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 315, 316 (1998)
(reporting that by 1990 the IPCC was certain that greenhouse gas emissions
resulting from human activities were causing warming of the Earth’s atmosphere
and predicting temperatures to increase one degree Celsius if greenhouse gases
continued to be emitted in the same manner); see also ENVTL PROT. AGENCY,
Climate Change: Basic Information, http://epa.gov /climatechange/basicinfo.html
(last updated Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter EPA, Climate Change: Basic
Information] (outlining various causes and consequences of global warming,
including sea level rise and the shifting of previously predictable events such as
migration patterns and blooming schedules).
26. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Status of
Ratification of the Convention, http://unfccc.int/essential_ background/
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter Convention Ratification Status] (indicating the agreement came into
force in 1994 upon the deposit of the 50th ratification instrument, and that there are
currently 195 parties to the convention).
27. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (elucidating the aim of the UNFCCC as
the stabilization of the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
without certain adverse impacts).
28. See generally id. art. 4 (enumerating the actions to which all parties to the
UNFCCC commit).
29. See id. (binding the parties to the UNFCCC to develop inventories, adopt
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convention.30 This is because the UNFCCC does not concretely state
a level by which parties must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions
and there is no real enforcement mechanism for redressing
violations.31 Instead, the most ardent requirement of the UNFCCC is
that states adopt national policies to mitigate climate change with the
“aim” of returning to 1990 emissions levels by 2000.32 Nevertheless,
the UNFCCC requires parties to, at a minimum, assess policies that
encourage emissions.33
1. UNFCCC Article 4: Commitments
The heart of the UNFCC is in Article 4, which contains the
commitments. The commitments that are particularly relevant to this
discussion require that parties (1) implement measures to mitigate
climate change by addressing anthropogenic sources of emissions,34
(2) promote practices and processes that reduce or prevent emissions,
including from the agricultural sector,35 (3) promote sustainable

policies to mitigate climate change, coordinate with other parties to meet the goals
of the Convention, provide financial resources to developing nations, provide
assistance in response to the impacts of climate change, and take steps to promote
environmentally responsible technologies, among other requirements).
30. See, e.g., Tushar Mathur, UNFCCC Meets on Climate Change, TALKING
ABOUT GREEN (Dec. 4, 2008), http://talkingaboutgreen .com/unfccc-meets-onclimate-change (mentioning that, because the UNFCCC is a non-binding
agreement, parties have since aimed towards establishing mandatory emissions
limits). Interpreting the UNFCCC as binding is also consistent with readings by
many scholars. See, e.g., Breidenich et al., supra note 25, at 317 (explaining that,
under Article 4(1), parties are “obligated” to undertake measures to mitigate
climate change and that Article 4(2) “requires” industrialized country parties to
adopt policies that limit emissions of greenhouse gases).
31. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 14 (instructing that parties shall seek
settlement of any dispute relating to the UNFCCC through negotiation).
32. See id. art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (declaring that UNFCCC parties commit to returning
to 1990-levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions by 2000 and
periodically report on the measures that they are taking to reach that goal).
33. See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 8, at 70 (asserting that the
UNFCCC requires developed parties to review their policies to assess whether they
encourage increased emissions and coordinate with other parties to meet the goals
of the UNFCCC).
34. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(b) (requiring the regular publishing
and taking inventory of sources and sinks of greenhouse gas emissions).
35. See id. art. 4(1)(c) (compelling states to “promote and cooperate” in
reducing and preventing emissions of greenhouse gases from the “energy,
transport, industry, agriculture forestry and waste management sectors”).
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management of sinks and reservoirs,36 (4) take climate change
considerations into account in relevant social, economic, and
environmental policies,37 (5) adopt policies to mitigate climate
change by limiting emissions of greenhouse gases and by protecting
sinks and reservoirs with the aim of returning to 1990 emissions
levels by 2000,38 and (6) identify and review domestic policies which
encourage increased emissions of greenhouse gases.39
Relevant to interpreting the scope of these commitments are the
principles delineated in Article 3, which instruct that parties “shall be
guided by” certain considerations in implementing UNFCCC
commitments.40 Particularly illustrative is the principle that measures
adopted by the parties should promote sustainable economic growth
for all parties to the convention, particularly for developing
countries.41
2. Kyoto Protocol and Subsequent Developments
The Kyoto Protocol is a supplement to the UNFCCC that set
36. See id. art. 4(1)(d) (requiring states to maintain and enhance, where
available, greenhouse gas sinks); see also id. art. 1 (defining a “sink” as “any
process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a
precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere” and a “reservoir” as “a
component or components of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a
precurser of a greenhouse gas is stored”).
37. See Id. art. 4(1)(f) (mandating that parties consider climate change when
implementing “social, economic and environmental policies” while minimizing the
impact on the economy, public health and the environment).
38. See id. art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (setting a goal of reaching 1990 levels of emission
by 2000 while providing regular reports on the steps taken to make that progress);
see also U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for
Implementation, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 19902006, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBt/2008/12 (Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Nat’l
Greenhouse Data] (showing that the United States increased its greenhouse gas
emissions by 14.4% between 1990 and 2006 while countries such as the United
Kingdom and Germany decreased their emissions by 15.1% and 18.2%
respectively).
39. See UNFCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(d)(ii) (requiring an assessment of the
incremental greenhouse gas emissions resulting from policies and activities).
40. See id. art. 3 (including in the guiding principles factors such as
consideration of the economic well-being of developing nation parties and
promotion of an open and supportive international economic system).
41. See id. art. 3(5) (emphasizing that policies implemented by developed
country parties should encourage the sustainable economic growth of developing
nation parties).
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binding emissions targets for the European Union and 37 other
industrialized countries.42 Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed
nation parties are required to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions
to an average of 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2012.43 Among potential
methods of reducing emissions, the Protocol proposes phasing out
economic incentives and subsidies that encourage greenhouse gas
emissions.44 One of the most significant facts about the Kyoto
Protocol is that the United States never ratified it.45 The United States
is currently the only industrialized nation to refuse to sign the Kyoto
Protocol,46 and its refusal to do so is attributed to concerns about
42. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]
(establishing a series of requirements for Annex I states to reach the objectives of
the UNFCCC); see also Info. on Kyoto Protocol, supra note 16 (explaining that the
Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force on February 16, 2005, was enacted to
help achieve the objective of the UNFCCC by establishing mandatory emissions
reductions targets); see also discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the importance
of the Kyoto Protocol in analyzing UNFCCC obligations). “Annex I” Parties
include the industrialized countries that were members of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992. Conversely, nonAnnex I parties are mostly developing countries. See Parties and Observers, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfcc.int/parties_
and_observers/items?2704txt.php (last visited Oct. 10,2011) [hereinafter UNFCCC
Parties and Observers] (providing the respective definitions for “Annex I,” “Annex
II,” and “Non-Annex I,” and highlighting that Non-Annex I countries are generally
those developing countries which are especially vulnerable to the adverse effects
of climate change).
43. See Info. on Kyoto Protocol, supra note 16 (summarizing the requirements
of the Annex I countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020) While
the average reduction goal under the Kyoto Protocol is 5.2%, individual emissions
targets vary. Had the United States adopted the Kyoto Protocol, it would have been
bound to a 7% reduction while the U.K. is bound to an 8% reduction. Some
countries are allowed to increase emissions by up to 8%. See Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 15, Annex B.
44. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2 (asserting that states are required
to “implement and/or further elaborate” ways in which they are able to eliminate
policies that encourage emissions and are counter to the UNFCCC).
45. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfcc.int/kyoto_ protocol/
status_of_ratification/items/2613txt.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter
Kyoto Ratification Status] (listing the Protocol’s current signatories, indicating the
United States has signed, but not ratified the Protocol); see also infra notes 48-49
and accompanying text (discussing the political reasons for the U.S. failure to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol).
46. See U.N. Climate Talks and Power Politics: It’s Not About the
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competition with non-bound countries such as China and India.47 The
United States fears that countries such as China and India, which
were not classified as Annex I developed countries at the adoption of
the UNFCCC but have since become primary emitters of greenhouse
gases, would gain an unfair advantage in the global market due to
their Kyoto Protocol exemptions.48 Because it refuses to ratify the
treaty, the United States will not face any penalties for failure to
meet what would have been its 7% Kyoto Protocol emissions
reduction goal.49
To date, the most tangible reduction commitment made by the
United States is contained in the Copenhagen Accord, a non-binding
agreement containing voluntary pledges to reduce emissions from
heavy-emitting developed and developing nations.50 More recently,
Temperature: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the
H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 13 (2011) (Statement of Todd Stern,
Special Envoy for Climate Change) [hereinafter Climate Change Hearing]
(indicating that the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, but in 2001
announced that the US would not ratify the protocol).
47. See David E. Sanger, Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact on Global
Warming, N.Y. TIMES June 12, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/12/world/
bush-will-continue-to-oppose-kyoto-pact-on-global-warming.html?pagewanted=
all&src=pm (reporting on President Bush’s refusal to ratify the Protocol because of
the treatment of two of the largest CO2 emitters, China and India); see also Rod
McGuirk, Australia Signs Kyoto Protocol; U.S. Now Only Holdout NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS Dec. 3, 2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/new/pf/
83432535.html (reporting that, after Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the
United States became the sole industrialized nation to refuse to ratify it).
48. See Sanger, supra note 47 (explaining that the U.S. wished to avoid
undertaking emissions reduction commitments which might put it at a
disadvantage in the global market); see also Tom Levitt, Carbon Emissions: The
World in 2010, THE ECOLOGIST (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.theecologist.org/
News/news_analysis/383922/carbon_emissions_the_world_in_2010.html (noting
that China’s gross domestic product increased by 250% between 1992 and 2006,
that its CO2 emissions correspondingly rose by over 120%, and that, by 2020, nonAnnex I countries, such as China, India and Brazil, are expected to account for the
majority of global emissions).
49. See Frequently Asked Questions, PBL NETHERLANDS ENVTL. ASSESSMENT
AGENCY, http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/climatechange /faqs#vraag8 (last visited
Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter PBL] (showing that U.S. emissions have increased by
13% since 1990, and, thus, that the United States did not meet its UNFCCC target).
50. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the
Parties, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/C.7 [hereinafter
Copenhagen Accord] (requiring parties to submit greenhouse gas emissions targets
by Jan. 31, 2010); see also Alex Carr, UN Climate Conference (COP 16) Wrap up
and What to Watch in 2011, ENVTL. LEADER (Dec. 20, 2010),
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the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties produced the Cancún
Agreements,51 which, although binding, sidestepped the reissuance of
a new set of emissions targets.52 In late 2011, facing the imminent
expiry of the Kyoto Protocol, the U.N. Conference of the Parties
produced the Durban Platform, which, while binding on the United
States, again defers the commitment to binding emissions targets to a
later date.53
3. Principles of Treaty Interpretation
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna
Convention”) is the result of a decades-long effort by the U.N. to
codify customary international law on the law of treaties.54 Although
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2010/12/20/un-climate-conference-cop-16wrap-up-and-what-to-watch-in-2011/ (summarizing the key points from the
Copenhagen Accord, such as a pledge by the United States to reduce emissions by
17% from 2005 levels by 2020 and the development of provisions for the
monitoring, reporting, and verification of the voluntary pledges, and inferring that
the United States would prefer to adopt a new protocol that would bind China and
India rather than extend the Kyoto Protocol, which leaves these countries exempt);
Cheryl Pellerin, Copenhagen Accord Politically Significant but Not Legally
Binding, AMERICA.GOV (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.america.gov/st/energy
english/%202009/December/20091222131726lcnirellep0.1802179.html
(elucidating that the Copenhagen Accord resulted from informal negotiations
between the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Mexico and
twenty other nations and was thus not adopted as an official outcome of COP 15).
51. Cancun Agreements, Dec. 11, 2010, Decision -/CP.16, available at
http://www.unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/
pdf/cop16_lca.pdf.
52. See Lucia Green-Weiskel, Climate Clash in Cancún, THE NATION (Dec. 16,
2010),http://www.thenation.com/print/article/157156/climate-clashcanc%C3%BAn (discussing that, although the parties agreed to a $100 million
fund to help developing countries adapt to climate change, the parties skirted the
pressing matter of renewing reduction commitments).
53. See Durban Platform, supra note 15, ¶¶ 2–4 (agreeing to “launch a process
to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal
force under the Convention applicable to all Parties,” to establish this legal
instrument by 2015, and to have them come into effect from 2020); see also
Harvey & Vidal, supra note 15 (reporting that the Durban Platform is an
agreement to work on a new climate deal which will be binding on both developed
and developing state parties, and unlike the Kyoto Protocol, was signed by the
United States).
54. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]
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the United States is not formally a party to the Vienna Convention,55
the United States considers it to be an embodiment of customary
international law,56 thereby making the Vienna Convention an
appropriate guide for U.S. treaty interpretation.57 Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention contains the general rule of interpretation,
instructing that a treaty is to be interpreted in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of the treaty’s terms in its context and in light of
its object and purpose.58 It goes on to define “context” as including a
treaty’s text, preambles and annexes, and any instruments made by
one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty
and is accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty.59 Context can also include any subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty,
and any application of the treaty that reflects the consensus of the
(providing the international legal framework governing treaties between states);
see also Karl Zemanek, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Vienna, 23 May
1969, U.N. (2008) http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vclt/vclt.html (explaining the
impetus for codifying customary international law, and the near unanimous
agreement that the treaty is an accurate codification of customary international
law).
55. See UNTC, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx? &src=TRE
ATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en, (last updated
Oct. 22, 2011) [hereinafter UNTC] (listing the United States as having signed the
treaty on Apr. 24, 1970, but never having ratified the agreement).
56. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter STATE DEP’T] (considering “many provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the
law of treaties.”).
57. See MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 439–40, 448 (2009) (explaining that since 1969, there
has been a growing consensus that Articles 31 and 32 are reflective of customary
law); see also Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S.
Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431 (2004) (underscoring that, although
the United States has not officially ratified the Vienna Convention, it can be used
to analyze U.S. treaty obligations because it is a codification of customary
international law); see also Zemanek, supra note 54, at 3 (noting that even the
International Court of Justice refers to the Vienna Convention without examining
whether a litigant is a party to it).
58. See Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 31(1) (establishing a “good
faith” basis for interpreting the terms of a treaty according to the words’ ordinary
meaning and by the context of the treaty).
59. See id. art. 31(2)(b) (construing context broadly by including “any
instrument” in connection with the treaty and “accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty”).
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parties.60 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows for recourse to
“supplementary means of interpretation” in order to further support
the meaning drawn out by interpretation of a treaty under the Article
31 framework. “Supplementary means of interpretation” include
agreements and practices among a subgroup of treaty parties that
would not fall within the purview of Article 31, such as the Kyoto
Protocol. Analysis of the terms and context of the UNFCCC in
accordance with these principles will help elucidate the proper
interpretation of the Article 4 Commitments in Part III.A.61
4. The Clean Air Act
Following the publication of Rachel Carson’s groundbreaking
book Silent Spring in 1962,62 there was a new sense of urgency for
dealing with increasingly evident environmental ills caused by
human activity.63 In the wake of this growing environmental
cognizance, the social climate was ripe for the passage of sweeping
environmental statutes.64 In 1970, Congress enacted the first iteration
60. See id. art. 31(3)(a)-(b). Treaty interpretation through the lens of Article 31
is appropriate only where all parties to a treaty accept the interpretation of treaty
terms contained within qualifying “context.” See VILLIGER, supra note 57, at 429–
30. Thus, any elucidation of the meaning of the UNFCCC by the Kyoto Protocol,
which the United States did not ratify, is appropriately viewed only through the
framework of Article 32, which allows for supplementary means of treaty
interpretation. Id.
61. See discussion infra Part III.A (applying the Vienna Convention principles
to deduce that the UNFCCC is a binding instrument).
62. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
63. See Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY J. (Nov. 1985),
http://wwww.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/15c.html (last updated June 8, 2011)
(explaining that Rachel Carson’s book, which documented the toll of pesticide use
on bird populations, received nationwide attention and, consequently, paved the
way for environmental reforms in the following decade).
64. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4347 (2006) (promoting the minimization of impacts on the environment); 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901–6908a (2006) (intending to control the disposal of hazardous
wastes); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006) (establishing
the policy of Federal actions minimizing their impact on endangered species); 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1281a (2006) (attempting to “restore and maintain . . . [the]
integrity of the Nation’s waters”); see also Lewis, supra note 63 (explaining that
President Richard Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act on January
1, 1970 to mark the beginning of an “environmental decade,” which would see a
host of revolutionary environmental legislation).
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of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), which was most recently amended in
1990.65 The Clean Air Act was enacted to protect the public health by
limiting the quality and amount of pollutant that individuals and
companies are allowed to release into the air.66
The CAA shares not only the UNFCCC’s goal of protecting
human health and welfare through environmental regulation, but also
is structured similarly to the UNFCCC.67 For example, the structure
of the CAA is such that the enacting authority, the federal
government, does not develop or enforce mandatory air quality
standards.68 Under the framework of the CAA, the Environmental
Protection Agency is responsible for establishing national air quality
standards, non-enforceable guidelines that reflect the levels at which
there is no known or anticipated adverse effect on the public health
or welfare from a given pollutant.69 Another similarity between the
65. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (controlling the emissions of pollutants into
the atmosphere); see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIRTrends 1995 Summary:
Background, http://epa.gov/airtrends/aqtrnd95/backgrnd.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2011) [hereinafter AIRTrends] (acknowledging that air pollution causes health
problems ranging from eye irritation to premature death, has profound impacts on
the environment, and that the Clean Air Act was intended to combat these
problems).
66. See § 7401(b)(1) (declaring that the purpose of the CAA is to promote the
public health and welfare by enhancing the quality of the nation’s air); see also
AIRTrends, supra note 65 (noting that the CAA mandated the establishment and
enforcement of two types of air quality standards by the EPA to limit the air
pollution which could be emitted from “stationary sources” such as factories and
power plants).
67. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing the impetus,
purpose, and scope of the Clean Air Act).
68. Compare § 7401(b)(1) (declaring that the CAA’s purpose is to “protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare”), with UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 1(1) (aiming similarly to mitigate
climate change enough to prevent any “deleterious effects on . . . human health or
welfare.”).
69. See § 7409(a)(1)(A) (requiring that the EPA Administrator establish a
“national primary ambient air quality standard” and a “national secondary ambient
air quality standard” for each regulated air pollutant). National primary air quality
standards are set at the level necessary to protect the public health with an adequate
margin of safety. See id. § 7409(b)(1). National secondary air quality standards are
those levels requisite to protect public welfare. See id. § 7409(b)(2). These
standards do not consider technological or economic feasibility, and therefore
represent a goal rather than a mandate. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (holding that the CAA unambiguously bars cost
considerations in the setting of the air quality standards).
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UNFCCC and the CAA is that both defer the development and
execution of plans designed to achieve ambitious environmental
standards to subsidiary parties.70 Overall, like the CAA, the
UNFCCC provides a framework for addressing an environmental
problem, but it does not create precise, enforceable standards.71
The considerable structural and substantive similarities between
the CAA and the UNFCCC help drive the argument that the
UNFCCC is an instrument that creates non-discretionary obligations
on the United States.72

B. THE ROLE OF ANIMAL AGRICULTURE IN GLOBAL WARMING
After accounting for indirect emissions, estimates suggest that
agriculture is responsible for approximately 32% of global
greenhouse gas emissions.73 A very significant share of this is
70. See § 7410(a)(1) (designating the responsibility of adopting plans for the
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of air quality standards to the
states); see also UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 10 (establishing a subsidiary body for
implementation of the UNFCCC); Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427
U.S. 246, 250 (1976) (relating that each state is given wide discretion in
formulating its plan, and the EPA Administrator must approve a state-proposed
plan if it meets certain minimum criteria).
71. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (commanding parties to aim for
1990 level emissions by 2000, but not entailing any repercussions for failure to do
so); see also Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 259 (explaining that “the Administrator
must approve a plan that provides for attainment of the primary standards in three
years even if attainment does not appear feasible,” thus signaling that even state
plans that are unambiguously inadequate to achieve the national air quality
standards will nevertheless be approved). An additional domestic environmental
statute that that is enforceable but that does not create concrete standards is the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k
(2006). Section 6902(b) states “Congress hereby declares it to be the national
policy of the United States that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous
waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible.” Id. § 6902(b).
72. See discussion infra Part III.D (reasoning that mandated compliance with
the CAA shows by analogy that the UNFCCC should similarly be enforced within
the U.S.).
73. See JESSICA BELLARBY ET AL., GREENPEACE, COOL FARMING: CLIMATE
IMPACTS OF AGRICULTURE AND MIGRATION POTENTIAL 5 (2008), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/
report/2009/4/cool-farming-climate-impacts.pdf (noting that indirect sources of
greenhouse gas emissions from animal agriculture includes farm machinery,
transportation, agrochemicals, and deforestation); see also U.N. Food & Agric.
Org., Livestock a major threat to environment (Nov. 29, 2006),
http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/ news/2006/1000448/index.html (highlighting
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attributable to animal agriculture.74 On its own, animal agriculture is
responsible for approximately 18%75 of global greenhouse gas
emissions, making it a larger contributor than the entire
transportation sector.76 These figures comport with findings that the
livestock sector expands over a staggering 40-50% of the Earth’s
surface, and close to 50% of the continental United States.77
the significant, and growing impact of agriculture, specifically livestock, to climate
change inducing emissions).
74. See BELLARBY ET AL., supra note 73, at 8 (indicating that animal farming is
associated with 60% of global methane emissions, the largest single contributor).
75. Although animal agriculture comprised only 9% of carbon dioxide
emissions, the 18% figure is expressed in “carbon dioxide equivalent.” See KEITH
PAUSTIAN ET AL., AGRICULTURE’S ROLE IN GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION, PEW
CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2006). Because carbon dioxide, methane,
and nitrous oxide have different “global warming potentials” (“GWP”), or
warming effect on a per mass basis, carbon dioxide is assigned a value of 1, and
the relative effect of other greenhouse gases are expressed relative to that value.
Methane has a GWP of 21 (making it 21 times more potent than carbon dioxide)
and nitrous oxide has a GWP of 310. See id. (explaining the concept of GWP and
the relative GWPs of the three main greenhouse gases).
76. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32948, AIR
QUALITY ISSUES AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: A PRIMER 41 (2010) (highlighting
the split of agricultural sector greenhouse gas emissions between animal and
agricultural activity); see also HENNING STEINFIELD ET AL., U.N. FOOD & AGRIC.
ORG., LIVSTOCK’S LONG SHADOW: ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS 112
(2006) (elucidating that, after accounting for the greenhouse gases emitted by
enteric fermentation, manure management, fertilizer production, biomass burning,
operation of farm machinery, and irrigation, animal agriculture accounts for 18%
of total greenhouse gas emissions in carbon dioxide equivalent); see also Livestock
a major threat to environment, supra note 73 (summarizing findings by the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization that animal agriculture is not only a
chief contributor of greenhouse gas emissions, but also its rapid growth makes it an
especially potent source); see also World GHG Emissions Flow Chart, WORLD
RES. INST., http://cait. wri.org/figures.php?page=World-FlowChart&view=100
(last visited Oct. 26, 2011) [hereinafter WRI] (quantifying the input and output of
greenhouse gasses in the world, including 13.5% from transportation).
77. See BELLARBY ET AL., supra note 73, at 5 (emphasizing the large
contributions of the agricultural sector to greenhouse gas emissions and the
potential for the agricultural sector to become a greenhouse gas sink if different
practices were adopted widely. See generally PETE SMITH ET AL., Agriculture, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION (Kristin Rypdal & Mukiri wa Githendu eds.,
2007) (quantifying the coverage of agricultural lands at 40-50% of the earth and
highlighting management practices that would allow for an overall reduced impact
of agricultural emissions); UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., Land Use, Value, and
Management, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/LandUse/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2011) [hereinafter USDA] (indicating that 46% of the surface of the United States
is covered by agricultural lands and that the Federal Government is often used to
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Greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector have been
increasing annually, largely driven by increased methane and nitrous
oxide emissions—the principal byproducts of animal agriculture.78 In
fact, livestock production is responsible for more than 30% of the
United States’ emissions of methane, a gas that has 21 times the
global warming potential of carbon dioxide.79
With the global demand for meat and dairy set to double by 2050,
the climate change implications are daunting.80 In spite of these
dangers, the animal agriculture sector enjoys widespread exemptions
from federal and state environmental laws,81 even with government
acknowledgement that methane and nitrous oxide threaten public
health and welfare.82 To date, regulatory efforts concerning the
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions have largely ignored the
agricultural sector; instead they have focused on the industrial and
transportation sectors.83 In light of the significant role of animal
resolve conflicts with other potential land uses).
78. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 499 (suggesting that the
disproportionate increase of methane and nitrous oxide relative to other greenhouse
gases points to animal agriculture as the chief source of increasing emissions); id.
at 503 (indicating that N2O and CH4 are the main non-CO2 greenhouse gas
emissions from agriculture).
79. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 22 (breaking down the contribution of
different sectors to domestic methane emissions, including 34.2% from
agriculture); supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
“global warming potential” and the significantly higher warming potential of
methane relative to carbon dioxide).
80. See FOOD ETHICS COUNCIL, MEAT CONSUMPTION: TRENDS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2001) [hereinafter FEC] (citing U.N. statistics
that estimate that a growing population and rising global incomes will double the
2000-level meat demand by 2050).
81. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 7 (noting that the Clean Water Act exempts
most agricultural operations); see also id. at 19 (discussing that in December 2008,
the EPA finalized an exemption of animal agriculture operations from mandatory
reporting requirements for releases of hazardous substances into the air from
animal wastes).
82. See id. at 23 (reporting that the EPA Administrator found current
concentrations of methane and nitrous oxide, along with the other greenhouse
gasses, to threaten public health and welfare). Where programs aimed at
encouraging more environmentally sound farming practices do exist, participation
is only voluntary. See RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33898,
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. AGRICULTURE SECTOR AND
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 16 (2009) (detailing some of the new voluntary
environmental measures enacted in the 2008 Farm Bill, discussed in Part II.C.1).
83. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 238 (revealing that country
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agriculture in greenhouse gas emissions, the increasing demand for
animal food products, and the current lack of regulatory oversight, it
follows that the animal agriculture sector provides one of the most
promising opportunities for U.S. emissions reductions.84

C. U.S. AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES AND THEIR ROLE IN
PROMOTING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
Agricultural subsidies85 promote increased production of animal
food products in various ways.86 First, they may offer direct price
support or production incentives.87 Second, they reduce operational
costs by decreasing the price of necessary resources, allowing
otherwise unprofitable farms to stay in business.88 Subsidized crop
insurance and other safety nets create incentives for farmers to
expand production.89 Last, the externalization of the environmental
emissions reports submitted to the UNFCCC show that mitigation efforts focus on
non-agricultural sectors); see also JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 25 (reiterating that
current legislative proposals have not encompassed the agricultural sector).
84. See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., Global Climate Change, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
(last updated June 2, 2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/ briefing/globalclimate/
[hereinafter ERS] (recognizing that agriculture “has a potential role to play in
reducing the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide”).
85. “Agricultural subsidies” for the purposes of this comment refers to direct
subsidies on meat and dairy, as well as those on grains or water that reduce the
costs
of
animal
production.
Cf.
Subsidy,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/subsidy?show=0&t=1319679427
(last visited Oct. 26, 2011) (defining a subsidy as “a grant by a government to a
private person or company to assist an enterprise deemed advantageous to the
public”).
86. See DENNIS OLSON, INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY TRADE AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAM, BELOW-COST FEED CROP: AN INDIRECT
SUBSIDY FOR INDUSTRY, (2006), available at http://www.iatp.org/
files/258_2_88122_0.pdf (arguing that subsidies on animal agriculture have led to
overproduction, low prices for commodities, and growing market concentration);
see also STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 227 (suggesting the possibility of a
causal link between government subsidies on animal agriculture and natural
resource degradation).
87. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (discussing various ways that livestock and
dairy production is directly subsidized).
88. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 86, at 1 (discussing the indirect subsidy
bestowed upon industrial animal producers by agricultural subsidies which reduce
the price of animal feed).
89. See C. Edwin Young et al., Production and Price Impacts of U.S. Crop
Insurance Programs, 83 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 1196, 1197-98 (2001) (explaining
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costs of animal agriculture provides an additional subsidy.90 Critics
of farm support programs assert that subsidies distort production and
encourage concentration of production, comparatively harming
smaller producers and farmers in foreign nations.91 These
distortionary subsidies largely exist because of the immense political
power wielded by the agricultural sector.92

that there is an incentive for farmers to expand production after obtaining crop
insurance).
90. The “externalities” of animal agriculture are the costs of its impacts which
are external to the producers or markets for animal food products which are borne
by society at large. Animal agriculture causes degradation of natural resources
such as water, soil, and air and to wildlife biodiversity and human health, but these
costs are not reflected in market prices. Instead, the costs of removing microbial
pathogens, pesticides, or nitrates which leech from animal wastes into the water
supply are subsidized by society’s utility bills, taxes, and health care expenses. A
conservative figure for livestock’s externalized cost on the public is $713.6-$738.7
million a year. See generally Erin M. Tegtmeier & Michael D. Duffy, External
Costs of Agricultural Production in the United States, 2 INT’L J. OF AGRIC.
SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2004) (exploring the economic and environmental costs of
agricultural subsidies). Many environmental costs of animal agriculture are
externalized because individual economic decisions usually only consider private
costs and benefits. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 223 (asserting that
there is a market failure in agriculture where producers act solely in their selfinterest).
91. See DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41317, FARM SAFETY
NET PROGRAMS: ISSUES FOR THE NEXT FARM BILL 18 (2010) (discussing the
unintended consequences of U.S. agricultural subsidies on farmers in developing
nations because the costs of production are distorted by the subsidy).
92. See, e.g., RALPH M. CHITE & DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 34036, DAIRY POLICY AND THE 2008 FARM BILL 9 (2009) [hereinafter 2008
FARM BILL] (showing that the shift to mandated product price support for dairy
was facilitated by the largest dairy trade association, the National Milk Producers
Federation); see also SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 18 (stating that policymakers
representing dairy, along with other major commodities, have shaped subsidy
programs from their inception); see also Jesse Ratcliffe, Comment, A Small Step
Forward: Environmental Protection Provisions in the 2002 Farm Bill, 30
ECOLOGY L. Q. 637 (2003) (2003) (observing that the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 is one of many sequential federal laws that protect
American farmers at the expense of the environment); see also Daniel A. Sumner,
The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Agricultural Subsidies Program,
LIBRARY OF ECON. AND LIBERTY (2008), available at http://www.econlib.org/
library/enc/agriculturalsubsidyprograms.html (explaining that vegetables receive
minimal government support relative to “grains, oilseeds, cotton, sugar and dairy
products”).
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1. Direct Subsidies and Farm Safety Nets
Currently, the federal mechanism for regulating agriculture is the
Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (“2008 Farm Bill”).93
The 2008 Farm Bill provides direct support to the animal agriculture
industry through price support measures, commodity programs, risk
management programs, and disaster assistance programs.94
The dairy industry, for instance, received direct payments totaling
$994 million in 2009.95 The dairy industry also benefits from
government-backed price support, which protects farmers from
decreases in revenue caused by seasonal fluctuations in supply and
demand that otherwise can put farmers out of business.96 In addition
to price support, incentive programs provide bonus payments to U.S.
dairy exporters, and conversely, assess taxes on all imported dairy
products.97 Critics of these programs contend that they are simply
taxpayer-financed income transfers to agricultural producers.98 Even
dairy groups have expressed concern that dairy price support
programs ultimately hurt the dairy industry.99
93. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–246, 122
Stat. 1651 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Act].
94. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 1-2 (outlining the three basic parts of the
farm safety net framework in the 2008 act: commodity programs, risk management
programs, and supplemental disaster assistance).
95. See id. at 9. The United States has notified the WTO that the aggregate
measure of its support for the dairy price support program is more than $4.8 billion
annually. These programs are classified “amber box” by the WTO, representing
the most trade-distorting category of subsidies. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note
92, at 10; United States Dairy Program Subsidies, EWG Farm Subsidy Database,
http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&
progcode=dairy&page=conc&yr=2009&regionname=theUnitedStates (last visited
Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter EWG Farm Subsidy] (indicating the top twenty percent
of applicants received nearly sixty percent of the dairy subsidies in 2009).
96. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 7-9 (explaining that the USDA
removed 115 million pounds of nonfat dry milk from the market in 2008 to
insulate declining milk prices).
97. See id. at 13-15 (noting that, while the Dairy Export Incentive Program was
developed to offset foreign dairy subsidies, it later became a market development
measure, and that dairy importers currently pay 7.5¢ per unit).
98. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 5-6 (summarizing critics’ concerns over the
burden on taxpayers as well as the potential to inflate agricultural land prices); see
also Chris Edwards, Ten Reasons to Cut Farm Subsidies, CATO INST. (June 28,
2007), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8459 (echoing the sentiment
that farm subsidies merely transfer the earnings of taxpaying families to farms).
99. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 10 (stating that some producers
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Farmers also benefit from safety net provisions such as subsidized
crop insurance. Federal crop insurance is an important farm risk
management tool with exceedingly vast reach.100 Crop insurance
programs have expanded in recent years101 despite assertions that
government subsidization of crop insurance encourages the
expansion of crop production onto sensitive lands.102 Livestock
specific programs indemnify ranchers for livestock mortalities
caused by disaster and assist ranchers who graze livestock on
drought-affected land.103 Other programs reimburse livestock
producers for feed losses caused by natural disasters.104 In yet
another program, the “Milk Income Loss Contract,”105 some farmers

argue that price support artificially stimulates milk production, causing persistent
surpluses and depressed prices).
100. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 9 (noting the program’s widespread
popularity due to it covering a “substantial portion of the farmer’s crop insurance
premium” paid by the federal government).
101. See id. at 9 (noting the growing importance in federal crop insurance
subsidies); see also id. at 13 (listing insurance programs new to the 2008 Farm
Bill, covering drought and disaster damages); Young et al., supra note 89, at 1197
(relaying that in 1999 and 2000, insurance premium subsidies increased, which
reduced farmers’ costs for catastrophic damage insurance coverage).
102. See id. at 10 (summarizing the concerns raised by critics who claim that
subsidization through insurance distorts the crop market, encouraging the
production of crops in sensitive marginal lands).
103. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, Fact
Sheet, Livestock Indemnity Program, (Feb. 2011), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/
Internet/FSA_File/lip09.pdf [hereinafter LIP Fact Sheet] (explaining the eligibility,
scope and coverage of the Livestock Indemnity Program, including annual
coverage of $100,000); UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY,
Fact Sheet, Livestock Forage Disaster Program, (Feb. 2011),
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/lfp_2011_pfs.pdf [hereinafter LFDP
Fact Sheet] (summarizing the provisions of the Livestock Forage Disaster
Program, including the per head recovery rate based on animal type and size); see
RALPH M. CHITE & DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 21212,
AGRICULTURAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE 4, 5 (2010) [hereinafter Agric. Disaster
Assistance] (elaborating on the coverage of additional insurance programs, such as
the “Livestock Indemnity Program” and the “Livestock Forage Disaster Program,”
which subsidize livestock producers).
104. See Agric. Disaster Assistance, supra note 103, at 6 (discussing the
insulation of farmers from the impact of variations in feed grain yield through the
“Livestock Compensation Program” which paid producers of livestock in disaster
areas).
105. See generally Fact Sheet, Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program,
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, (Apr. 2011),
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/milc2011.pdf [hereinafter MILC Fact
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are eligible for federal payments whenever the market price for milk
falls below a certain rate.106 Some legislators fear that this sort of
program results in overly generous payouts to producers because
compensation is triggered at levels of revenue loss that can be
explained by normal variation in crop yields.107
Other safety nets include disaster assistance programs, under
which farmers can receive “catastrophic coverage” without paying a
premium, and indemnity payments guaranteed by crop insurance.108
Producers in natural disaster areas can receive supplemental
payments for crop losses and obtain emergency disaster loans at
below-market interest rates.109 In addition to these subsidies, other
programs encourage the production of animal food products.110 In
sum, these subsidies have fostered the long-term decline in the price
of grains, which has, in turn, helped keep the price of animal
Sheet] (detailing the provisions of the MILC program, which compensates milk
producers when milk prices fall).
106. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 3 (explaining that, from Oct. 1 2008
to Aug. 1, 2012, farmers are eligible to receive 45% of the difference in the market
rate of milk and the prices established by the statute).
107. See Agric. Disaster Assistance, supra note 103, at 8-9 (summarizing the
concerns of critics relating to the low trigger for the assistance, which could be
triggered by typical yield changes from year to year and result in windfalls to the
farmers).
108. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, Fact Sheet,
Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program for 2009 and Subsequent Years,
(Mar. 2009), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet /FSA_File/nap09.pdf [hereinafter
NAP Fact Sheet] (describing the disaster crop loss coverage provided to crops that
would not otherwise qualify for federally subsidized insurance); Agric. Disaster
Assistance, supra note 103, at 2 (revealing that these premiums are fully
subsidized, and noting that this provision is triggered by a loss in actual or planned
crop acreage).
109. See Agric. Disaster Assistance, supra note 103, at 3, 8 (explaining that
producers may be eligible for low-interest emergency disaster loans for up to 100%
of actual production).
110. See Michael Moss, While Warning About Fat, U.S. Pushes Cheese Sales,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
6,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11
/07/us/07fat.html?_r=1&pagewanted (noting that the USDA launched an antiobesity campaign discouraging the overconsumption of fatty foods while investing
$140 million per year into promoting cheese consumption, despite government
data showing that cheese is a major contributor to the high fat content of the
average American diet); see also Who We Are – Cattlemen’s Beef Board,
http://www.beefboard.org/about/whoweare.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2011)
[hereinafter Cattlemen’s Beef Board] (describing the involvement of the USDA in
the Cattlemen’s Beef Board, which was created to stimulate the sale of beef).
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products artificially low, stimulating animal product consumption
and production.111
2. Indirect Subsidies
In 2009, the federal government allocated nearly $4 billion to corn
producers,112 $1.72 billion to soybean producers,113 and $270 million
to sorghum producers.114 Because a majority of these grains are used
as feed for livestock, these commodity support programs indirectly
subsidize animal agriculture.115 Financially, it is industrial factory
farms that benefit the most from indirect subsidies because they
receive a reduction of around 15% on their most significant operating
cost—feed.116 Given that feed accounts for 50-65% of these farms’
operating costs, this price reduction translates to a savings of $3.6
billion a year.117
Another major operational cost in animal production is water; this
too is a resource that is heavily subsidized for the animal agriculture
sector.118 Any subsidy that artificially decreases the price of animal
111. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 12 (explaining the effect of a
steady decrease in grain prices since the 1950s as an increase in livestock
production and an associated increase in demand for feed).
112. See United States Corn Subsidies, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP,
http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=corn (last visited Oct.
28, 2011) [hereinafter US Corn Subsidies] (indicating that the $3.78 billion in corn
subsidies was nearly evenly split between direct payments and insurance premium
subsidies).
113. See United States Sorghum Subsidies, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP,
http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode= sorghum (last visited
Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter US Sorghum Subsidies] (reporting a split more heavily
weighted towards insurance premium subsidies over direct payments)
114. See United States Soybean Subsidies, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING
GROUP,http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=soybean (last
visited Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter US Soybean Subsidies] (relaying the split to
favor direct payments more heavily than crop insurance subsidies).
115. See OLSON, supra note 86, at 1 (stating that 60% of the corn and 47% of the
soy grown in the United States is used for animal feed).
116. See id. at 1-2 (highlighting the findings of the USDA which assert that feed
accounts for 60-64% of poultry and egg operating costs, 17% for beef, and 47% for
hogs).
117. See id. at 1 (criticizing the extent of discount conferred upon industrial
animal producers by federal subsidy programs, and noting the 7-10% potential
increase in price of animal produce if farmers were paid a fair amount for feed
crops).
118. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 245 (highlighting that farmers
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food products is significant because meat consumption has been
shown to be “elastic,”119 meaning that its consumption falls with
increasing prices.120 Thus, the fact that the real price of livestock has
fallen in the modern era helps explain the corresponding increase in
consumption.121
3. Economic State of the Agricultural Sector
While subsidies are presumed to be necessary to the operation of
the agricultural sector,122 economic analyses suggest that farmers
would not be subjected to serious additional losses as a result of
subsidy reform.123 Rather, these studies reveal that the industry
receive a subsidy from the under-pricing of water, with rates as low as .03% of the
household consumer price); see also Tegtmeier & Duffy, supra note 95, at 5-6
(exploring the cost of externalization of water degradation from livestock
production, including treatment of pathogens, nitrates, and pesticides in public
water supplies, which is estimated to cost $118.6 million).
119. “Elasticity” is defined as “the responsiveness of a dependent economic
variable to changes in influencing factors.” Elasticity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elasticity (last visited
Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Elasticity].
120. See Craig A. Gallet, Meat Meets Meta: A Quantitative Review of the Price
Elasticity of Meat, 92 AMER. J. AGRIC. ECON. 258, 260, 268 (2010) (finding, via a
meta-analysis, that meat consumption is “elastic,” with a median elasticity of -.869
for beef, such that its consumption would be expected to decrease with increases in
price); cf. Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases
Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCIENCE
1238, 1238 (2008) (remarking that increases in corn price produced by biofuel
demands had the affect of depressing demand for meat).
121. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 231-32 (suggesting that the
removal of price distortions on resources used in animal agriculture would curb
overall consumption); see also Mark Bittman, Rethinking the Meat Guzzler, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/weekinreview/27/
bittman.html (describing the growing global demand for meat as production costs
decrease and global average incomes increase).
122. See Elizabeth Becker, Raising Farm Subsidies, U.S. Widens International
Rift,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
15,
2002,
http://www.
nytimes.com/2002/06/15/international/europe/15FARM.html (acknowledging the
viewpoint that farm subsidies are necessary to keep U.S. agriculture competitive
globally, despite the opposition of various foreign governments).
123. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 98 (arguing that countries that repealed
agricultural subsidies, such as New Zealand, consequently had stronger
agricultural sectors, thus deducing that the United States could benefit from New
Zealand’s model); See generally, David Harris & Allan Rae, Agricultural Policy
Reform and Industry Adjustment in Australia and New Zealand, AGECON SEARCH,
(June 6, 2004), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/ 15762/1/cp04ha01.pdf
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already operates at a loss, and subsidies merely allow an
unsustainable system to continue operating.124 The production of
U.S. upland cotton125 is a good example. It would not be profitable to
produce cotton in the United States without subsidies.126 However,
due to generous subsidies, the United States remains the leading
exporter of cotton.127
The impact of biofuel subsidies on land usage demonstrates that an
increase in the demand for a product leads to an increase in its
production.128 The federal government funneled close to $6 billion to
biofuel producers in 2009 in an effort to promote corn-based
ethanol.129 This led to a 30% increase in the demand for corn,
culminating in the expansion of corn production into non-traditional
crop areas.130

III.ANALYSIS
As described in Part II.A, the UNFCCC mandates that its parties
(highlighting the reforms made to agricultural policy in Australia and New Zealand
towards free trade and the remaining programs available to assist farmers in
adjusting to those changes).
124. See OLSON, supra note 86, at 3 (opposing agricultural subsidies because
farmer incomes have declined by 16.5% despite the tripling of government subsidy
payments between 1996-2001).
125. Upland Cotton, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/upland%20cotton (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) (defining
upland cotton as “a widely cultivated American cotton plant . . . having short- to
medium-staple fibers”).
126. Joseph Stiglitz, The Tyranny of King Cotton, GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2006),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/2006/oct/24/stig/ (concluding that the
$3-$4 billion in cotton subsidies provided to the cotton industry are keeping the
industry afloat).
127. See id. (using cotton subsidies to show that subsidies in developed
countries harm developing countries by increasing overall output and lowering
overall prices).
128. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 19 (indicating that the nearly $6 billion in
subsidies paid to corn producers for the promotion of biofuel manufacture in 2009
increased the land area used for corn production).
129. Id.
130. Id. This example merely serves to highlight that subsidization leads to
overproduction, not to argue that biofuels are deleterious to the environment. See
generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., EIB BULL. NO. 79, THE
ETHANOL DECADE: AN EXPANSION OF U.S. CORN PRODUCTION, 2000-09 (2011)
(discussing how corn-based ethanol production affected land-use decisions made
by farmers).
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reflect on policies that may be encouraging emissions, as well as
“aim” to mitigate climate change by implementing a range of
domestic measures.131 An examination of the core commitments
enumerated in Article 4 of the UNFCCC, keeping in mind Article 3’s
guiding principles, demonstrates that the UNFCCC is a binding
convention that can be breached even though it lacks both concrete
emissions targets and enforcement mechanisms.132 Domestic
environmental statutes also demonstrate, by analogy, that it is not
unprecedented or uncommon to have binding laws that lack exact
commitment levels and defer enforcement to other authorities.133

A. EXAMINATION OF THE UNFCCC REVEALS THAT ITS ARTICLE 4
COMMITMENTS ARE BINDING
As discussed in Part II.A.3, the Vienna Convention is widely
acknowledged as applicable to treaty interpretation for the United
States despite lack of ratification by the United States.134 The Vienna
Convention does not require that the text of a treaty be unclear or in
dispute for external contextual materials to be rendered appropriate
for interpretation.135

131. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (requiring parties to adopt
national policies designed to mitigate climate change to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels).
132. See Vienna Convention, supra note 54, arts. 31, 32 (outlining the
requirements for authentic treaty interpretation and supplementary means of
interpretation, respectively); see also discussion infra Part III.A (showing that the
language and context of the UNFCCC indicate the binding nature of the
Convention).
133. See discussion infra Part III.D (comparing the UNFCCC to the Clean Air
Act).
134. See Vienna Convention, supra note 54; see also Criddle, supra note 60, at
435 (explaining that the Convention has served as an authoritative guide to treaty
law for the executive and legislative branches despite its non-ratified status). But
see id. at 447, 449 (noting that although U.S. courts regularly apply Articles 31
through 33 of the Vienna Convention, “the Supreme Court has never relied upon
the Vienna Convention as an authoritative source of law.”).
135. See Criddle, supra note 57, at 440 (pointing to the low threshold for
triggering Article 32 analysis utilizing a treaty’s ancillary materials); see also id.
(asserting that the committee charged with drafting the Vienna Convention itself
considered a treaty’s contextual analysis “accumulative, not consecutive,” thus
highlighting that outside materials can be analyzed in tandem with the text itself,
and not exclusively after dispute about the meaning of the text arises).
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Before addressing the substantive violations of the UNFCCC
commitments that derive from the U.S. subsidization of animal
agriculture, it is necessary to establish that the UNFCCC is a binding
treaty that can be violated. A textual analysis of the UNFCCC
reveals both explicit and implicit evidence of the convention’s
binding nature. Most saliently, Article 4 is titled “Commitments.”136
The fact that all of the actions delineated in Article 4 fall under this
title is the first indication that parties are committed to undertake the
actions outlined therein.137
In addition, Article 4(1) begins with the command that all parties
“shall” engage in the enumerated list of activities in an effort to
mitigate climate change.138 Given the lofty objective of the
UNFCCC, to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at a level that will
not cause dangerous interference with the climate, it is unlikely that
the UNFCCC was intended to be powerless.139
Further evidence that the UNFCCC is binding is the fixed goal for
parties to reduce their emissions.140 It would be curious indeed to set
a target date for actions that were neither required nor expected to
take place.141 Additionally, the designation of 1990 emissions levels
136. UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4.
137. See Commitment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/commitment (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (defining
“commitment” as “an agreement or pledge to do something in the future,” or “the
state or instance of being obligated”).
138. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1); see also Alabama v. Bozeman, 533
U.S. 146, 146 (2001) (recognizing that “shall” is the language of command); Shall,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “shall” as “[h]as a duty
to; more broadly, is required to” and adding that “[t]his is the mandatory sense that
drafters typically intend and that courts typically uphold.”); Shall, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shall (last
visited Oct. 6, 2011) (indicating that “shall” expresses mandatory action when used
in laws or directives).
139. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (endeavoring to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases in recognition of the fact that a failure to do so
will cause “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”). The
objective outlined in Article 2 of the UNFCCC is relevant to this analysis because
the first general rule of treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention explains that
the textual meaning is to be construed “in the light of its object and purpose.” See
Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 31(1).
140. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (instructing that parties are to
aim to return to 1990 level greenhouse gas emissions by 2000).
141. Cf. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (finding the
explicit articulation of a deadline as dispositive as to whether compliance was
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as the standard for reduction by 2000 does not comport with the idea
that compliance with the UNFCCC is optional.142 Thus, although the
emissions reduction requirement defined in the UNFCCC is loose,
this imprecision is not a valid justification for disregarding the
UNFCCC’s mandates entirely.143
Less overt yet nevertheless telling evidence that the UNFCCC is
binding lies in Article 4(2)(g) of the UNFCCC.144 According to this
provision, any non-Annex I party may elect to be bound to reducing
its emissions to its 1990 level.145 That the UNFCCC gives non-bound
countries the discretion to bind themselves to the UNFCCC
commitments is significant for a few reasons. First, by allowing nonAnnex I parties to opt into the obligations enshrined in Article
4(2)(a)-(b), the text implies that Annex I parties are bound to the
provision by default.146 Second, by explicitly using the word
“bound,” it verifies that Annex I parties are, in fact, under an
obligation to adhere to Article 4 commitments, as are those nonAnnex I countries that choose to bind themselves.147 Third, it
showcases the relative weight of the UNFCCC mandates on
developing countries versus Annex I developed countries, and
thereby reveals that U.S. compliance with the UNFCCC is subject to
the utmost scrutiny because the United States is an Annex I
country.148
required).
142. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(a)-(b); see also discussion infra Part
III.D (demonstrating that imprecise requirements in U.S. environmental statutes
have not rendered them optional).
143. See infra notes 196-223 and accompanying text (showing that having an
exact standard is not required to uphold environmental statutes within the United
States).
144. UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(g).
145. Id.
146. See id. Annex I countries, which are the subjects of the commitments
housed in Article 4(2) of the UNFCCC, are not offered the choice of binding
themselves to those commitments because they must comply with the terms
already. Non-Annex I countries, however, are not automatically bound to Article
4(2), and therefore may elect to undertake those additional obligations. By
reserving this discretion exclusively to non-Annex I nations, the UNFCCC text
shows that Annex I countries are by default bound to its terms.
147. See id.; see also Bind, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://merriamwebster.com/dictionary/bind (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (defining the verb “bind” as
“to put under an obligation,” or “to constrain with legal authority.”).
148. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(g); see also id. art. 4(2)(a) (affirming
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Similarly, Article 4(6) affords a certain degree of flexibility in the
implementation of Article 4 commitments to parties whose countries
are undergoing a transition to a market economy.149 By giving
leniency concerning implementation exclusively to countries
undergoing an economic transformation, Article 4(6) shows that
developed country parties, such as the United States, are required to
strictly abide by the UNFCCC commitments.150 It would not be
necessary to allow “flexibility” for any party if the entire treaty were
in fact non-binding.151
A final provision that demonstrates that the UNFCCC is binding is
Article 25, which allows for “withdrawal” from the UNFCCC
subject to a few conditions.152 Withdrawal from a treaty that does not
demand or expect compliance is unnecessary and therefore would
not be anticipated by UNFCCC drafters intending a non-binding
body of commitments. Taken together, these articles of the UNFCCC
make clear that Article 4 commitments are binding and possible to
violate.

B. SUBSIDIES ON ANIMAL AGRICULTURE VIOLATE UNFCCC
ARTICLE 4(1)
1. UNFCCC Article 4(1)(b) Violation
The first UNFCCC article subject to U.S. violation due to
agricultural subsidies is Article 4(1)(b), which requires that parties
implement and regularly update programs containing measures to
mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases.153 The ordinary meaning of the text of Article
that the UNFCCC Annex I countries must take the lead in reducing emissions and
acting in accordance with UNFCCC objectives).
149. See id. art. 4(6).
150. See id.
151. Cf. supra note 146 (explaining the implications of explicitly distinguishing
between the obligations of types of parties).
152. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 25.
153. Article 4(1)(b) indicates that it requires compliance by using the word
“shall.” Compare UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(b) (directing that parties
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4(1)(b) indicates that parties must implement or update national
programs containing measures to mitigate man-made sources of
greenhouse gas emissions.154
Because the 2008 Farm Bill, which governs the allocation of
agricultural subsidies, is a national program containing measures
intended to mitigate climate change, the United States is required to
update the program in light of evidence which unambiguously
demonstrates the extent of animal agriculture’s contribution to total
greenhouse gas emissions.155
The Kyoto Protocol demonstrates its awareness that mitigation
measures required under the UNFCCC will need to include
reductions in the animal agriculture sector, where it suggests
reducing methane emissions by improving waste management.156
Especially noteworthy, though, is Article 2(1)(a)(v) of the Kyoto
Protocol, which urges parties to phase out any fiscal incentive or
subsidy that has the effect of increasing greenhouse gas emissions.157
“shall” perform various duties where commitments are intended to be binding),
with id. art. 15(1) (granting discretionary authority to propose amendments by
using the word “may”), and id. art. 17(1) (imparting further discretionary authority
to create protocols to the UNFCCC by using the word “may”), and id. art 25(1)
(using the word “may” to give parties discretion to withdraw from the UNFCCC).
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (contrasting this mandatory language
with language that points to discretionary authority).
154. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(b) (explicitly ordering parties to
“[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national . . . programmes
containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic
emissions . . . ”); see also supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining the
significance of the use of the word “shall”).
155. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(b) (instructing that parties must
regularly update national programs containing measures to combat climate change
by addressing anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas emissions); see also
RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34696, THE 2008 FARM BILL:
MAJOR PROVISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION 155 (2008) (showing that the
“Global Climate Change Prevention Act of 1990” was extended through fiscal year
2012 by the 2008 Farm Bill); see also discussion supra Part II.B (summarizing the
environmental tolls of animal agriculture).
156. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2(1)(a)(viii) (explicitly referencing
“waste management” as an area through which methane emissions could be
reduced); see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 83, at 506, 510 (explaining the
relationship between animal waste and emissions, and how manure management
can be improved to address emissions).
157. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2(1)(a)(v) (promoting the reduction
or removal of “fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all
greenhouse gas emitting sectors . . .” to lower parties’ emissions levels).
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These excerpts explicitly reveal the UNFCCC parties’ sensitivity to
the potential need for the repeal or reassessment of distortionary
agricultural subsidies that inadvertently encourage greenhouse gas
emissions. While these specific provisions of the Kyoto Protocol are,
of course, not enforceable against the United States, they do support
the interpretation that, at a minimum, UNFCCC Article 4(1)(b)
requires that the United States reevaluate and update its emissionencouraging agricultural policies158
The fact that the Farm Bill has repeatedly been extended and that
there are no signs of its imminent revision give rise to an Article
4(1)(b) violation.159 Serious revision of the economic policies
incentivizing climate change within the Farm Bill is necessary to
overcome
the
Article
4(1)(b)
violation.160

2. UNFCCC Article 4(1)(c) Violation
Another article that shows the United States’ reluctance to abide
by the UNFCCC is Article 4(1)(c).161 Under this article, parties are
required to promote the development of practices and processes that
reduce or prevent emissions of greenhouse gases in all relevant areas,

158. See discussion supra Part II.B (revealing the toll animal agriculture exacts
on the environment).
159. See discussion supra Part II.C (linking certain agricultural subsidies to
increased demand for emission-heavy animal food commodities). Additionally,
Article 4(2)(d) and Article 4(2)(e) together require that parties to the UNFCCC
review domestic policies and practices that encourage anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases at regular intervals until the objective of the Convention is met.
See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(d)-(e). This provision unequivocally
reiterates the mandatory nature of reassessing domestic policies that directly or
indirectly contribute to increased greenhouse gas emissions. This too shows that
compliance with the UNFCCC was not intended to be optional because the
provision creates an ongoing obligation that cannot be abandoned until the goal is
attained. See id.
160. See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing in more detail the potential
courses of action the United States could take to address the current UNFCCC
violations).
161. See UNFCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c) (calling for parties to “[p]romote . . .
practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases,” including in the agricultural sector).
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including agriculture.162 It is worth mentioning that the obligation
enumerated here is an affirmative one, and it, therefore, is not
facially at odds with the United States’ laissez-faire stance
concerning current agricultural subsidization.163
Nevertheless, this Article remains significant. It explicitly
references emissions from the agricultural sector, dispelling any
doubt that the agricultural sector is within the domain of the
UNFCCC’s control.164 Under this article, the United States is clearly
required to “promote” the development of practices and processes
that reduce or prevent emissions of greenhouse gases in
agriculture.165 What is unclear from the UNFCCC language alone,
however, is the extent to which parties are required to “promote”
emissions-reducing practices and processes in agriculture, and
whether a mandate to “promote” certain practices or processes
encompasses its implementation. The concrete mandate of this
provision is ambiguous because it simultaneously uses mandatory
language and the broadly defined word “promote” as the operative
verb. Because mere “promotion” of processes or practices to reduce
or prevent greenhouse gases may not necessitate implementation,
and thereby lead to an interpretation that nearly nullifies the intent of
provision, supplementary means of interpretation are warranted for
UNFCCC Article 4(1)(c). While subsidies may not represent a
failure to promote practices or processes that reduce emissions, they
do represent an unambiguous failure to implement appropriate

162. Id.
163. An affirmative duty is “[a] duty to take a positive step to do something,”
and can thus only be violated by an agent’s failure to do something. Duty,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, considering only the plain
meaning of Article 4(1)(c), the U.S. must fail to take any measures to promote
practices and processes designed to control greenhouse gas emissions to fail in the
duty outlined in the Article. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c). Although the
continued promotion of animal agriculture cannot be violative of this article when
the word “promote” is taken at face value, the Kyoto Protocol identifies a way to
refine its meaning and thereby highlights how agricultural subsidies are generally
problematic. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2(1)(a)(v)-(vi); see also
UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c).
164. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c) (stating that parties shall promote
the development of practices and processes that reduce greenhouse gas emissions
“in all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture,
forestry and waste management sectors”).
165. UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c).

1024

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[27:4

reforms within the agricultural sector.166

3. UNFCCC Article 4(1)(d) Violation
An additional UNFCCC article that points to the problematic
nature of U.S. agricultural subsidies is Article 4(1)(d).167 Under this
article, the United States is required to preserve greenhouse gas sinks
and reservoirs such as forests.168 Therefore, by actively encouraging
the expansion of agricultural lands through subsidized crop insurance
and other federal agricultural incentives, and consequently
encouraging the destruction of greenhouse gas sinks and
reservoirs,169 the United States is in violation of Article (4)(1)(d).170
4. UNFCCC Article 4(1)(f) Violation
Article 4(1)(f) instructs parties to take climate change
considerations into account in relevant social, economic and
environmental policies and actions.171 The plain language of this
article suggests that the United States is violating the UNFCCC.172
166. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c); see also discussion supra Part II.B
(reminding that most attempts to control greenhouse gas emissions overlook the
agricultural sector).
167. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(d).
168. See id. art. 4(1)(d) (indicating that parties are required to “promote
sustainable management . . . of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases…”);
see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (elaborating on the role of
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs in curbing climate change).
169. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(d) (requiring parties to promote sinks
and reservoirs, indicating that destruction of sinks and reservoirs is a violation).
170. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(d). The United States is encouraging
the destruction of sinks and reservoirs by significantly financing animal production
operations that require vast amounts of land and encroach upon forests and other
greenhouse gas sinks. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 32 (explaining that
the advent of grain-feeding livestock in North America “has greatly increased the
arable land requirements of livestock production…to about 34% of total arable
land today.”); see also supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text (illustrating
that increased corn demand leads to expanding agricultural land areas).
171. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(f).
172. Because Article 4(1)(f) asks that parties “[t]ake climate change
considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social,
economic and environmental policies and actions . . . with a view to minimizing
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Given that the Farm Bill subsidizes an industry that contributes so
significantly to climate change,173 it cannot be said that the Farm Bill
seriously takes climate change considerations into account.
The continued subsidization of animal agriculture violates an
additional dimension of Article 4(1)(f) that mandates parties to
employ appropriate means to minimize adverse effects on the
economy.174 Language elsewhere in the UNFCCC demonstrates that
“economy” does not refer solely to domestic economies, but rather
refers to the global economy.175 The UNFCCC repeatedly stresses the
importance of the consideration, by developed countries, of the
economic impact of their policies on developing nation parties to the
UNFCCC.176 This is particularly apparent in Article 3(5) of the
UNFCCC, which stipulates that parties to the Convention must try to
promote an international economic system that promotes economic
growth for developing country parties.177 This shows that the United
States is violating UNFCCC Article 4(1)(f) in two ways: first, by
failing to take established climate change considerations into account

adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the
environment . . . ,” the refusal of the U.S. government to revise the 2008 Farm Bill
with environmental considerations in mind is a facial violation of the UNFCCC.
See id.; see also discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C (expanding on the Farm Bill’s
promotion of greenhouse gas emissions, and highlighting that the Farm Bill is a
relevant economic policy pursuant to UNFCCC Article 4(1)(f)).
173. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C. Moreover, the U.S. government
acknowledges the extent of greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture and yet
continues to grant various allowances for pollution. See SMITH ET AL., supra note
77, at 503 (revealing that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(“IPCC”) gives estimates of animal agriculture’s contribution to methane and
nitrous oxide emissions at 47% and 58%, respectively); see also ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, Methane: Sources and Emissions, http://www.epa.gov/methane/
sources.html (last updated Apr. 18, 2011) (demonstrating that the EPA is aware
that livestock production is a significant source of methane emissions); supra note
86 and accompanying text (showing that the government continues to grant various
exemptions from environmental requirements in spite of its awareness of animal
agriculture’s noxious climate-warming effect).
174. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(f) (asking parties to “[t]ake climate
change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social,
economic and environmental policies and actions . . .”).
175. See, e.g., id. pmbl., arts. 3(2), 3(5), 4(7), 4(9).
176. Id.
177. See id. art. 3(5) (stipulating additionally that parties’ measures to combat
climate change “should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”).
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in existing economic policies, such as the Farm Bill, and second, by
neglecting the economic consequences of U.S. agricultural subsidies
on developing nation parties to the UNFCCC.178
While a full analysis of the international trade implications of U.S.
agricultural subsidies is outside the scope of this Comment, this point
bears some elaboration because the duty of Annex I countries to
foster the economic growth of developing country parties is
reiterated repeatedly in both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.179
Developing countries object to the heavy subsidization of the U.S.
agricultural sector because the inundation of artificially low-priced
agricultural goods produced in the United States into world markets
prevents developing countries from being competitive.180 The World
Trade Organization (WTO) echoes these concerns about U.S.
agricultural subsidies.181 Recently, Brazil challenged U.S. cotton
subsidies in the WTO, where the subsidies were denounced for
distorting trade and unfairly impinging on Brazil’s cotton exports.182
The United States paid Brazil $147.3 million in fines in lieu of
178. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (showing the various ways
that the U.S. continues to subsidize the animal agriculture industry); see also supra
note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the trade implications of cotton
subsidies).
179. See, Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2(3) (requiring that parties included
in Annex I strive to implement policies in a way that will minimize adverse
economic effects on developing country parties); UNFCCC, supra note 8, pmbl.
(affirming that the parties’ responses to climate change should take into account
developing countries’ need to achieve sustained economic growth and to eradicate
poverty).
180. See Gumisai Mutume, Mounting Opposition to Northern Farm Subsidies,
17 AFR. RECOVERY 18 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev
/geninfo/afrec/vol17no1/171agri4.htm (reporting that U.S. cotton subsidies have
threatened the continued existence of communities in countries like Burkina Faso,
where communities depend on cotton trade for survival and producers are
increasingly unable to compete with the cheap cotton produced in the United
States); see also Becker, supra note 122 (summarizing the dispute between
developing countries and the United States with regard to agricultural subsidies in
the aftermath of the extension of the Farm Bill in 2002).
181. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 10 (explaining that the WTO has
classified U.S. dairy subsidies as “amber box” because they belong to the most
trade-distorting category of domestic subsidies).
182. See WORLD TRADE ORG., Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS267, United
States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (detailing the
dispute surrounding the subsidization of U.S. upland cotton, which constituted
significant price suppression and “serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil”).
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repealing the cotton subsidies.183 Evidence suggests that all major
subsidized crops in the United States are potentially vulnerable to
dispute settlement challenges pursuant to the WTO agreements.184
This demonstrates that, like cotton subsidies, U.S. subsidies on
animal agriculture do not foster the economic growth of developing
countries; therefore these subsidies are contrary to UNFCCC Article
4(1)(f).185

C. SUBSIDIES ON ANIMAL AGRICULTURE VIOLATE UNFCCC
ARTICLE 4(2)(A)-(B)
What is likely the most demanding, and certainly most widely
recognized, formal requirement of the UNFCCC is housed in Article
4(2)(b), which requires the United States and other Annex I countries
to aim to reach 1990 emissions levels by 2000.186 The ordinary
meaning of the text suggests that, despite the lack of concrete
binding emissions levels, signatories are required to aim to meet their
respective 1990 emissions levels.187 The broad and lofty goals of the
183. See Sewell Chan, U.S. and Brazil Reach Agreement on Cotton Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink
?index=0&sid=5&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=3&sta (discussing how an
agreement was reached after Brazil planned to impose $830 million in WTOauthorized sanctions on the U.S.);
see also Mark Drajem, Brazil, U.S. Agree to Avoid Tariffs in Dispute on Cotton
Trade, Kirk Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
print/201004-06/u-s-to-suspend-export-credit-program-in-bid-to-end-brazil-tradedispute-html (reporting the outcome of the Brazil-U.S. WTO dispute, and
showcasing that there is a growing need for Congressional review of farm
subsidies).
184. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 21 (warning that other agricultural subsidies
are likely as susceptible to WTO challenges as were the cotton subsidies). See
generally RANDY SCHNEPF & JASPER WOMACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
33697, POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO U.S. FARM SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO (2007)
(discussing the vulnerability of U.S. agricultural programs to WTO settlement
challenges).
185. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 10 (explaining that the WTO
considers some of the U.S. animal agriculture related subsidies to be of the most
trade-distorting variety).
186. See id. art. 4(2)(b).
187. The use of the word “shall” in Article 4(2)(a)-(b) conveys that the
commands contained in those provisions are not intended to be voluntary. See id.,
art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (prefacing the obligation to aim to reduce emissions to 1990 levels
with the word “shall”); see also supra note 153 and accompanying text
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UNFCCC signatories similarly highlight that the continued
promotion of a practice that contributes to 18% of global greenhouse
gas emissions vis-à-vis agricultural subsidies is far from consistent
with the UNFCCC mandates.188
As shown above, there are numerous indicators within the text of
the UNFCCC to suggest that the UNFCCC envisioned for its parties
to be bound to Article 4, however imprecise the standard.189
Language from the Kyoto Protocol further reinforces that UNFCCC
drafters anticipated that mitigation measures would be focused on
reforms of relevant economic policies, including the removal of
subsidies that inadvertently encourage emissions.190 It also suggests
that the drafters expected that the policies and practices of the
agricultural sector, in particular, would ultimately need to be
ameliorated.191

D. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT SHOWS THAT
INTERPRETING THE UNFCCC AS BINDING AS IT APPLIES TO THE
UNITED STATES IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Though an interpretation of the UNFCCC that rests a violation on
a failure to aim to meet a standard may seem dubious, such an
interpretation is not incongruous with existing law, and is instead
supported by analogous domestic environmental statutes.192 A salient
example of such a statute is the Clean Air Act (CAA).193
(contrasting the mandatory and permissive language used within different articles
of the UNFCCC).
188. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (calling for the “stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”); see also
discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C (showing the effect of animal agriculture on
emissions and the effect of agricultural subsidies on promoting animal agriculture).
189. See discussion supra Part III.A (pointing to various provisions within the
UNFCCC which indicate that it was intended to be a binding instrument).
190. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, arts. 2(1)(a)(iii), 2(1)(a)(v)-(vi).
191. See id. (encouraging, explicitly, that parties reduce or remove subsidies and
encourage reforms in the agricultural sector).
192. See discussion infra Part III.D (demonstrating the structural similarity of
the UNFCCC to a binding U.S. environmental statute).
193. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006); see also discussion supra Part II.A.4
(introducing the objective of the CAA, as well as its structural similarities to the
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Like the UNFCCC, the CAA suffers from the fact that the statute
itself does not create precise, enforceable air quality standards.194 In
fact, the CAA was challenged on the basis of lacking an “intelligible
principle” to guide the EPA’s exercise of authority in setting the
national air quality standards.195 However, the Supreme Court
recognized that it had previously never required that statutes quantify
exactly how much harm is too much, and thus upheld the CAA.196 It
follows from this decision that, in the context of determining U.S.
treaty obligations under the UNFCCC, the integrity of the
Convention should not be undermined by its failure to provide a
“determinate criterion” for what level of greenhouse gas emissions is
appropriate.197
In another case, the Supreme Court held that the EPA was required
to continue to regulate carbon dioxide emissions even where its
emissions-regulating authority overlapped with that of another
executive agency.198 Thus, even when another authority lawfully
executed one of the EPA’s Clean Air Act duties, the EPA was still
not entitled to forgo its responsibilities.199 Likewise, the UNFCCC
cannot continue to go unenforced even if an ancillary instrument,
like the Kyoto Protocol, appears to be filling the regulatory void left
by the UNFCCC.200
UNFCCC, which supports drawing an analogy to the UNFCCC).
194. See § 7407(a) (explaining that the CAA is implemented by individual
states, which develop their own plans for meeting national air quality goals).
195. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)
(describing the procedural history of the case to frame the ultimate reversal of the
Court of Appeals’ decision that the CAA lacked an “intelligible principle” and thus
violated the Constitution’s non-delegation doctrine).
196. See id. at 475-76 (holding that there was no unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the EPA despite the breadth of the CAA and its minimal
guidance on setting national air standards).
197. See id. (citing Am. Trucking Ass’n., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 175
F.3d 1027, 1034 (1999)) (overturning the Court of Appeals’ decision because a
precise standard or a “determinate criterion” is not necessary to make the CAA
enforceable).
198. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 531-32 (2007)
(holding that, although the Department of Transportation had authority to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles, the EPA was also required to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions because the EPA’s statutory obligation to
promote public health is wholly independent of the Department of Transportation’s
mandate to promote energy efficiency).
199. Id.
200. Cf. id. at 531-32 (suggesting that one authority’s original responsibility
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That the CAA is enforceable despite its structural similarity to the
UNFCCC is visible from the countless and frequent cases against
violators of the CAA.201 Especially worthy of note is that, although
the enforcement authority of the CAA is almost entirely transferred
to the states,202 the cases are often brought jointly by local
governments and the Federal government. Also noteworthy is that
the EPA’s disapproval of deficient state implementation plans has
been upheld.203 This means that the EPA has authority to sanction
states for inadequate adherence to the CAA even if the EPA is not
able to directly enforce compliance with the national air quality
standards.204
Given the UNFCCC’s similarity to established and potent
domestic law, it follows that the UNFCCC must be binding and that
U.S. economic policies promoting greenhouse gas emissions are
violative of it.205 By analogy, the CAA suggests that, while UNFCCC
parties cannot be sanctioned for failure to reduce their emissions to
1990-levels, parties can be sanctioned for their failure to try.206
continues, even where another authority possesses and acts on overlapping
authority).
201. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Compliance and Enforcement,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/newsroom/ (last updated Oct. 9, 2011) (displaying
the last 100 cases of successful enforcement of CAA claims since April 19, 2011).
202. See § 7407(a) (relinquishing enforcement authority to the states, thereby
paralleling the structure of the UNFCCC); see also, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
Cement Manufacturer to Pay $1.4 Million for Clean Air Act Violations, (Feb. 10,
2011),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ab2d81eb0%2088f4a7e85257359003f53
39/268868a4634671da85257833006c3b41 (showing that the EPA, the Department
of Justice, and Ohio state authorities jointly secured a $1.4 million settlement with
a cement manufacturer and these proceeds are to be distributed to the U.S.
government, the State of Ohio, and Ohio’s affected counties).
203. See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 880 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
EPA’s disapproval of Virginia’s state implementation plan for failing to comply
with the CAA where it did not incorporate certain required provisions).
204. See id. (underscoring that the federal government retains authority to
induce state action through sanctions).
205. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C (elaborating on the tendency of
agricultural subsidies to increase demand for production of subsidized
commodities, and discussing how the production of animal food commodities
contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, and how increasing demand exacerbates
the environmental consequences).
206. See generally id. (showing that under the CAA, noncompliance can be
sanctioned by the EPA, the central authority, even though that authority is unable
to enforce specific air quality standards).
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IV.RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE IDEAL SOLUTION: ELIMINATION OF AGRICULTURAL
SUBSIDIES
The elimination of subsidies that currently incentivize the
overproduction of animal food commodities is the ideal solution to
the UNFCCC violations discussed herein. This is because the United
States cannot continue to encourage practices that are demonstrably
contributing to global climate change while also being in compliance
with the Convention.207 Due to the unpopularity of advocating for a
decrease in consumption of animal food products despite the clear
link between their production and greenhouse gas emissions,
scholars often advance suggestions that would mitigate emissions by
improving technologies or intensifying production.208
While mitigation efforts from improved technologies or improved
feed-to-product ratios are potentially preferable to present policies,
they are likely to prove insufficient.209 Even if technologies are
improved such that production causes fewer greenhouse gas
emissions per unit of animal food product, the emissions will
increase due to the predicted doubling of production of animal food
products by 2050.210

207. See discussion supra Parts III.B, III.C (finding that U.S. agricultural
subsidies violate the UNFCCC because the subsidies promote greenhouse gas
emissions).
208. See, e.g., SMITH ET AL., supra note 77, at 510 (explaining how dietary
additives aimed at suppressing methane production, selective breeding, and
improved feed practices could help reduce emissions associated with livestock
production); Jennifer A. Burney et al., Greenhouse Gas Mitigation By Agricultural
Intensification, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12052, 12055 (2010) (asserting that
“intensification,” or the increase of productivity of current agricultural lands,
releases fewer greenhouse gases than would producing the same amount of
agricultural products more conventionally on greater land areas).
209. See P. Gerber et al., Policy Options in Addressing Livestock’s Contribution
to Climate Change, 4 ANIMAL 393 (2010) (arguing that mitigating technologies
can play a crucial role in addressing climate change, but asserting that the greater
challenge will be addressing livestock emissions in countries not obligated to abide
by the UNFCCC).
210. STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 275. See generally Burney et al., supra
note 209 (establishing that the intensification of agriculture does not offset the
greenhouse gases emitted by bringing new cropland into use).
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Another potential solution is to tie subsidies to environmental
incentives, such as shifting subsidies on conventionally produced
corn or soy to organic products.211 However, these programs also
create problems, including the creation of incentives for more
farmers, across the globe, to increase production using subsidized
technology, resulting in greater net global emissions.212 Tax
incentives for reduced emissions are likewise problematic because
they potentially pose problems from an international trade
standpoint.213
Other widely touted measures include emissions cap and trade
systems, which assign emissions quota to producers but allow them
to buy others’ surpluses to lawfully exceed their quotas.214 Thus, with
a trading system, total emissions may only decrease modestly
because producers can simply buy permission to emit in excess of
their purported limits.215
Any mechanism that would effectively mitigate emissions must
impose accurate costs on production so that environmental costs are
not unjustly borne by society.216 Removal of subsidies is the most
effective way to ensure environmental costs are no longer
externalized; this is because other means may inadvertently increase
211. See Annise Maguire, Shifting the Paradigm: Broadening Our
Understanding of Agriculture and Its Impact on Climate Change, 33 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 275, 306-12 (2010) (recognizing, however, that shifting
subsidies to organic farming would be a less comprehensive solution compared
with other measures, such as all-inclusive legislation regulating agriculture).
212. See Henning Steinfeld & Pierre Geber, Livestock Production and the
Global Environment: Consume Less or Produce Better?, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 18237-8 (2010) (discussing the potential for advanced technology to increase
the efficiency of animal agriculture in developing nations where the demand for
animal products is increasing).
213. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187, 190 (establishing the principle of “national treatment,” that imported
and locally-produced goods should be treated equally); see also Gerber et al.,
supra note 210, at 397, 403 (explaining that trade law requires that all ‘like’
products be taxed at the same rate, regardless of production method).
214. See Gerber et al., supra note 210, at 398-99 (noting that, because farmers
who sell offsets receive higher profits, these programs create “an incentive for
more farmers to increase production using the subsidized . . . technology.”).
215. See id. at 398.
216. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (elaborating on the problems of
externalization of the costs of environmental degradation associated with animal
agriculture).
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emissions or are simply not aggressive enough.217 Further, because
removing subsidies is feasible, the United States should strive to
eliminate its subsidies on animal agriculture to the fullest extent
possible.218
The example of New Zealand illustrates that elimination of
agricultural subsidies is not only possible, but that it can promote a
healthy and strong agricultural industry.219 New Zealand has the
lowest rate of agricultural support as a share of gross domestic
product of any OECD country.220 In spite of this, New Zealand’s
agricultural sector has enjoyed great sustainability in its agricultural
sector.221

B. STRENGTHEN THE UNFCCC WITH AN ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISM AND GREATER BREADTH OF CONTROL
A second possible remedy for the U.S. violation of the UNFCCC
is to amend the UNFCCC in several ways; however it would be
undeniably difficult to convince all of the nearly 200 parties to agree
to any substantive amendments.222 Because the current reporting
requirement of the UNFCCC has proven to be ineffective at pushing
parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from animal agriculture,
the UNFCCC should establish an enforcement authority that can
impose economic sanctions rather that merely encourage voluntary

217. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (explaining the deficiencies of a
cap and trade system for incentivizing greenhouse gas mitigation where farmers
trade credits to worse greenhouse gas emitters).
218. See discussion supra Part II.C (describing the role of agricultural subsidies
in promoting greenhouse gas emissions); see also Stiglitz, supra note 126
(discussing the harmful effects of subsidies on U.S. farmers and consumers, and
arguing that the U.S. would serve its own interests by eliminating subsidies). Cf.
Gerber et al., supra note 210, at 400 (using New Zealand as an example of a
country that has successfully eliminated most agricultural subsidies).
219. See Gerber et al., supra note 210, at 400 (examining the success of a nearly
subsidy free emissions trading program for New Zealand’s livestock farmers).
220. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN
OECD COUNTRIES: MONITORING AND EVALUATION 2007 195-196 (2007)
(reporting that, from 2004 to 2006, New Zealand had a .3% support rate for
agriculture, significantly lower than that of the U.S.).
221. Id. at 195, 200.
222. See Sanger, supra note 47, at 1 (noting the challenges of negotiating
environmental standards between nations).
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negotiations.223 Additionally, because economists are able to roughly
quantify the cost per cubic ton of carbon dioxide, nations exceeding
their quotas should be charged for their overage plus penalties.224
While the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol currently make wide
allowances for non-Annex I countries with respect to greenhouse gas
emissions, there needs to be acknowledgement that in the near future,
non-Annex I countries will be responsible for the majority of global
greenhouse gas emissions.225 Because all parties that are major
contributors to greenhouse gas emissions should be subject to the
UNFCCC’s regulations, the definition of “Annex I” should be
revised.226 Finally, because the Kyoto Protocol will expire in 2012,
the UNFCCC should be amended to require that each of its parties
adopt the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.227 This would
ensure that stubborn parties, like the United States, could be
compelled to undertake binding obligations even if such
commitments are politically unpopular.228

V. CONCLUSION
As a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the United States is obligated to abide by the
commitments contained therein.229 Central to the UNFCCC is the
goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions from human-caused
sources so that dangerous changes in climate, resulting from the
223. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(a) (requiring that parties make
available inventories of national anthropogenic emissions “of all greenhouse gases
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol…”); see also id. art. 14 (calling for
negotiation between convention parties in the event of a dispute about the
UNFCCC’s terms or application).
224. See Tegtmeir & Duffy, supra note 90, at 10 (noting that the market price
per cubic ton of carbon dioxide equivalents was $0.98 in 2003, based on the
Chicago Climate Exchange).
225. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing
significance of emissions by China, India, and Brazil).
226. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, at 4(1) (explaining the relative responsibilities
of Annex I and non-Annex I parties).
227. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (illustrating the significance of the
imminent expiry of the Kyoto Protocol).
228. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (demonstrating the original reasons why
the United States refused to be bound to the Kyoto Protocol).
229. See discussion supra Part III.A (explaining that the UNFCCC language is
binding, and therefore that the United States is bound to the commitments set forth
in Article 4).
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buildup of atmosphere-warming gases, can be avoided.230 However,
the United States currently disregards the UNFCCC’s mandates to
review domestic policies that encourage emissions and to attempt to
reduce national gas emissions to 1990 levels.231 Of particular concern
is the fact that the United States continues to subsidize animal
agriculture, even in the face of evidence that subsidies encourage
greenhouse gas emissions.232 By offering high levels of farmer
income support, safety nets, and reduced-price resources for the
production of animal food products, the United States encourages the
expansion and overproduction of animal food products, thus
contributing to climate change in disregard of the UNFCCC.233
The United States faces a fresh opportunity to take meaningful
steps to reduce its culpability in climate change by binding itself to
concrete emissions targets upon the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol.234
If it chooses to do so, the United States can amend the policies of its
agricultural sector, which presents tremendous room for progress,
and bring itself into compliance with the UNFCCC while restoring
its credibility as a leader in climate change mitigation.235 Finally, as
one of the world’s top greenhouse gas emitters, the United States
needs to comply with the UNFCCC in order to help avoid the harsh
consequences of accelerated global warming.

230. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (expressing that the objective of the
UNFCCC is to thwart possible adverse consequences from human-induced climate
change).
231. See id. arts. 4(1)-(2); see also discussion supra Part II.C (linking the
subsidization of animal agriculture to an increase in demand for practices that
encourage greenhouse gas emissions).
232. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C (providing background information on
the role of animal agriculture in global warming and the economic mechanisms
which incentivize production in animal agriculture).
233. See id.
234. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (explaining that the upcoming expiration
of the Kyoto Protocol will undo internationally binding emissions limits unless the
Kyoto Protocol is extended or a new agreement is reached).
235. See CNN Wire Staff, Obama Says Laws Must be Updated After Oil
Disaster, CNN (June 10, 2010), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/politics/06/10/
obama.gulf.spill/index.html (showing that Obama believes the United States needs
to prove that it is a leader in innovative sustainability initiatives and improved
pollution laws); see also discussion supra Parts III.B, III.C (discussing the nature
of U.S. UNFCCC violations).

